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ВЛИЯНИЕ СТРУКТУРЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ И КОМПЕНСАЦИИ НА ФИНАНСОВЫЕ РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ КАЗАХСТАНСКИХ КОМПАНИЙ

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Аннотация

Цель исследования – изучить влияние компенсации управленческого персонала, разнообразия состава управленческого персонала, а также наличия государственного участия на финансовые показатели листинговых компаний в Казахстане.
Методология. Взаимосвязь в исследовании изучается на основе выборки из 156 годовых наблюдений по компаниям с помощью обобщенного метода моментов (ОММ).
Оригинальность / ценность исследования. Исследование дополняет существующую литературу, нацеленную на практики корпоративного управления, путем сопоставления вознаграждения руководства листинговых компаний в Казахстане с результатами деятельности компаний, а также изучения влияния разнообразия состава управленческого персонала и государственного участия. Исследование также имеет практическое использование с точки зрения пересмотра политики вознаграждения топменеджмента за счет усиления взаимосвязи между компенсацией высшего руководства и показателями деятельности компаний. Кроме того, в исследовании подчеркивается, что увеличение разнообразия состава управленческого персонала может благотворно повлиять на результаты деятельности компаний в контексте Казахстана. В конечном итоге, исследование могло бы заинтересовать политические и академические круги путем стимулирования требований по раскрытию информации о компенсации для компаний, тем самым повышая прозрачность практик корпоративного управления.
Результаты исследования. В результате исследования обнаружена положительная, но статистически незначительная взаимосвязь между компенсацией управленческого персонала и показателями деятельности компании, основанных на бухгалтерском учете, то есть рентабельность активов (ROA) и рентабельность собственного капитала (ROE). Однако, присутствие иностранного управленческого персонала в руководстве компании оказывает значительное положительное влияние на результаты деятельности, на основе ROA. С другой стороны, наличие государственного участия оказывает незначительное негативное влияние на результаты деятельности компании. В исследовании также использовались контрольные переменные на уровне компании и страны, где получены неоднозначные результаты. Обнаружено значительное отрицательное влияние размера компании, инфляции и левериджа на рентабельность активов, в то время влияние валового внутреннего продукта (ВВП) на результаты деятельности компаний положительное.

Об авторах

А. Оразаева
Университет КИМЭП
Казахстан
Алматы


М. Арслан
Университет КИМЭП
Казахстан
Алматы


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Для цитирования:


Оразаева А., Арслан М. ВЛИЯНИЕ СТРУКТУРЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ И КОМПЕНСАЦИИ НА ФИНАНСОВЫЕ РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ КАЗАХСТАНСКИХ КОМПАНИЙ. Central Asian Economic Review. 2020;(5):86-105.

For citation:


Orazayeva A., Arslan M. IMPACT OF THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND COMPENSATION ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF KAZAKHSTANI COMPANIES. Central Asian Economic Review. 2020;(5):86-105.

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