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ECONOMIES OF CONFLICT: CONTEXT AND ROOT CAUSES OF INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICTS IN KAZAKHSTAN

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ABSTRACT

Purpose of the research. This article aims to explore the validity of economic theories of conflict in explaining the root causes of intercommunal conflicts in Kazakhstan.

Methodology. Such theoretical overview and qualitative methodological approach offer a more nuanced picture and constitutes an initial step in tailoring context-specific de-escalation strategies.

Originality / value of the research. Through in-depth case study of Korday clashes in 2020, it challenges scholars who have attributed the roots of intercommunal conflict to lingering Soviet legacy and language politics. This literature takes communal grievances that attribute conflict to identity politics and/or rights for granted. They concentrate on discourse and take complaints at face value. Instead, this article explores applicability of the economic theories of «greed» and «relative deprivation» in conflict contexts.

Findings. By using results of our fieldwork supported by research project of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan, we show that «greed» hypothesis explains the predatory context on the local level, while the relative deprivation theory explains the perceptions of local population. The combination of these two conditions provided fertile ground for the collective grievances and served as the primary causes of conflict.

Keywords: Relative deprivation theory, intercommunal violence, greed-grievance debates, root causes of conflict, conflict context.

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INTRODUCTION

The intercommunal violence is not a frequent subject of academic discussions in Kazakhstan, let alone from economic perspectives (for rare example, please see [1]. The topic of violence is relegated to the field of Political Science and Sociology, while economists often pay attention to the conventional themes of measuring the quality of human resources [2], banking sector [3], energy development and sustainability [4]. Nonetheless, economic literature on conflict has an elaborate scholarship that is worth exploring since it has dominated and even challenged alternative perspectives, such as those who attribute conflicts to communal grievances and those who vest their explanations in identity politics. After reviewing the rights-based and identity-based arguments, we move to the description of economic theories of conflict in order to illustrate the validity of such explanations in the case of Korday clashes in 2020.

Korday case was chosen not only because it was big in scale, but also because it shared similar patterns with other cases and because journalists from all walks of life consistently reported on violence and its aftermath [5; 6; 7; 8; 9]. The case is also interesting, since besides an economic perspective, it is easy to interpret it from non-economic points of view. Social media played a role in mobilizing supporters as it merged two separate cases into a single «story». After two videos that went viral on social media: one with a private fight between young people belonging to two ethnic groups; and another with Dungan youngsters running away and then challenging the police, thousands of Kazakh nationals mobilized to «teach Dungsans a [behavior] lesson» [5]. The shared myths of Dungsans not serving in the army or not paying taxes were amplified by reckless politicians and influencers who framed the conflict as a matter of violations of majority rights (see [6; 7]). Others have made ethno-nationalist claims that such behavior undermines the quality of the Kazakh nation, which constitutes the founding role and bears primary responsibility for the well-being of its members (see [10; 11; 12]). In the span of 13 hours between February 7 and 8th, 11 people died and nearly 200 injured causing USD 4.5 million in property damages, including 168 houses and 122 cars [8]. The root causes of violence are crucial to understand the conflict context.

As most cases of intercommunal violence, Korday events took place in rural environment between residents of two villages: Karakemer – hosts about 3000 Kazakhs residents who primarily raise cattle and sell it to the meat processing plant (unofficially belongs to the former Akim of the village) and Masanchi – a larger village that hosts 24000 residents of Dungan community, who are involved in agriculture [13]. There is a small bridge that connects two settlements located just 300 meters from each other. The two groups engaged in different economic systems of production (cattle vs agriculture) causing one to have visibly higher standards of living vis-à-vis another with Dungan families having better homes and owning more cars (Interviews with residents from Karakemer).

We derive our data from the extensive fieldwork conducted between 2020-2023 with over 50 stakeholders selected based on the purposive sampling method, which included people who directly participated in the conflict and its resolution, witnessed it, possessed insider information, and/or carried professional expertise. We grouped them into the following categories: government representatives, which included district akims, local municipalities, presidential statements, local prosecutor's office, local police, and local representative of the Committee of National Security service. We also conducted interviews with local representatives of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, lawyers from both sides appointed in the legal process, community representatives of the minority, and majority. We also collected in-depth interviews with elders from both villages, Committee of mothers, and two school administrations. We supplemented interview data with findings derived from the legal proceedings and media reports. Sources for statements from the leaders of national-patriots came from various public platforms and social media.

Most scholars who study nation-building process in Kazakhstan treat ethnic diversity as a matter of Soviet legacy, which created a patchwork of ethnic groups, but introduced the concept of territorially-bounded «titular nation» [14]. Before the 1990s, the importance of titular nation was downplayed since everyone had to become Soviet and adopt supra-national Soviet identity [15; 16]. When the Soviet Union disappeared, these ethnic groups found themselves as «guests» on the territory of their adopted «home» [17]. Most independent republics began to build nation-states based on the «titular» nations, their culture and languages [18]. The nationalizing processes utilized Soviet practices of making «civic» nations based on the «ethnic» principles of the majority culture [19; 13]. The Soviet divisions between minorities and majorities in ethnicized republics provided an opportunity for ethnic majority to impose their own culture and languages. With this logic in mind, the violence can be interpreted as a matter of natural «nationalizing» trends that span across post-Soviet states after independence [20]. Such trends are also aggravated by demographic dynamics, which show the revival of nativist agenda [21]. Young people in Kazakhstan without the memory of the Soviet Union no longer aspire to support the «friendship of peoples» and are less tolerant to the liberal ideals of human rights, fair procedures, and the rule of law [22]. A new generation of young people strives to create an ethnic state with minorities abiding by formal and informal principles, practices, and rules [23]. Therefore, such interpretations rooted in identity politics pay attention to the disrespect of language, traditions, and behavioral norms, which represent the legitimate causes for establishing national unity and ensuring homogeneity, even at the expense

of violence. Although these scholars explain ethnic violence across the former Soviet republics and, possibly, causes of mobilization in conflict settings, they cannot explain the nature of violence in our case. Specifically, this theory cannot explain why bandits were highly prepared and operated in three groups: one robbing inside the house, the other robbing valuables in the yard (including cattle), and the third group setting the properties on fire. In other words, they also cannot explain why this violence took specific forms of arson, stealing and banditry rather than other in/formal and il/legal practices. If rights are violated, why representatives of the Kazakh majority did not report to the police for misconduct and/or why they did not rely on justice system or educational institutions to bring the message across working closely with community activists and families.

The second line of scholarship accuses the political regime of implementing confusing and ineffective nation-building policies. Ethnic tensions between Kazakh majority and minorities stem from the «double talk» [18], where political regime uses more nationalist language when speaking to the Kazakh audience and more civic identity language in other national and international media. As a result, the growing number of national-patriots feel supported by the regime and call for «Kazakhification» of state institutions, including state services [24], education [25], and reinterpretation of history [26] with overall recognition of their ethnic superiority. Although interesting to entertain, the theory of differing identity politics of both presidents did not change the scenario of violence. In other words, violent clashes followed similar patterns regardless of the regime in power and its discursive and disciplinary practices with notable examples in 2007 with Chechen and Kurdish communities, 2014 with Uzbek community, with Tajiks in 2015, with Turks in 2016, Dungans in 2020, and 2021 with Uyghur community. Ethnic minorities were stripped off their wealth by violent mobs who committed their own justice by stealing and robbing their communities. In addition, 30 years of independence created conditions when ethnic minorities understand Kazakh language and speak, even if with an accent, to understand the ongoing game. So language politics can no longer explain violence in places where both parties speak the same language and profess the same religion.

The story of ethnic clashes is not new. It shares a long history of studies that extrapolate similar stories from one region to another (for example [27]). Rather than outlining the much-discussed details of conflict and pointing fingers to the specific stakeholders, perpetrators and victims, we want to use this opportunity to set the conflict context in economic framework to show the importance of these theories in our case as they shed light on the patterns of violence and the practices. In the section below we introduce the greed-grievance debates in detail to explain the predatory context on the local level and then we describe the theory of relative deprivation to explain how Kazakh population perceived the minority. We then go into the case study to link the patterns of violence with economic context that informed the conflict in the first place.

MAIN PART

Economic Theories of Conflict. The question of what drives intercommunal conflicts: a desire for resources or frustrations over status and identity has been occupying the hearts and minds of many scholars. Those who adhere to the latter interpretations on collective grievances over status and identity focus on public statements of community activists and leaders of various organizations in order to understand the main reasons for mobilization under the common cause. In quantitative realm, this literature generally evaluates the scale of ethnic marginalization using statistical data to illustrate if political or social rights of communities are violated or if identity and status of people comes under attack or severe restriction (for example [28; 29]). This scholarly debate can be summed up into the greed-grievance dichotomy.

The greed hypothesis frames the conflict in economic terms and makes conflicts about access to and/or redistribution of resources and primarily focuses on the elites. Collier [30; 31; 32] have shown that collective grievances are not significant in conflict settings, but economic opportunities act as the primary causes of the war. By analyzing civil wars from 1965-2000, these scholars came up with an explanation that greed is the driving motivation, although it is often coated in the language of collective grievances [30]. Collier identifies the following logic to explain the findings: he writes that in the case of crisis (be it war or violent conflict), conventional rules and laws are suspended, and reputational costs remain minimal, since there are no sanctions for illegal and violent behavior [30]. As a result, theft and predatory actions enable people to obtain the highest rent from the locales they operate in, even for a short period of time. He interprets people's behavior in conflict

settings as a matter of adaptation to the new rules, where they establish and negotiate new forms of interactions and where the powerful dominate. For Englebert [33] violence is an outcome of rationale calculation between production and predation in the absence of contractual obligations (read: the law-enforcement). Rebels can allow for continuation of peaceful and voluntary exchange to take place, or they can engage in violence if the latter brings more short-term benefits. Greed, in this literature, treats violence as a calculated choice among options with varying incentives and a tool for the establishment of alternative systems of profit, power, and protection [34]. These systems can take different forms, such as used to finance violence, recruit more members or control and redistribute territories with natural resources or lucrative trading routes [35]. Violence is about «booty and loot» [32] organized by powerful elites.

In an attempt to link political violence conducted by powerful elites with economic reasons, [34] offered seven specific examples of economic functions of violence. He showed that violence can be used to change laws and administrative procedures in order to protect or undermine economic privileges [34]. It often takes place at the local level veiled by informality and undercover games. The second, most common function is pillage, which offers subsistence to people whose wages and salaries are too low [34]. Pillage can also take the form of protection money, a rent that is paid by victims to avoid violence to be inflicted upon them [34]. Thirdly, violence can also be used to monopolize and/or control trade, when conventional law enforcement is absent or ineffective [34]. Violent groups that control the territory can also engage in exploitation of labor making people work for free and keeping them in the conditions near slavery. We can also note the importance of controlling land in violent conflicts when due to depopulation or threat of extermination, land use can be redistributed among new actors and stakeholders [34]. Sixth, violence can be used to appropriate relief sent by state and international actors in order to gain access to it when it arrives. Lastly, the military remains the greatest beneficiary, as it gets budgetary expansion and other institutionalized benefits [34]. Although not all of these reasons are present in our case study, it is nonetheless important to illustrate the expanded list of victims and beneficiaries in intercommunal violence. It is also important to note that Keen's perspective enables us to link political violence conducted by states and/or government representatives with undergirding economic reasons.

Economic literature on conflict context is also interesting to survey here, as it has strong implications on motivation for the use of violence among main actors. Collier notes that economic inequality and the government's economic incompetence represent the key factors as opposed to grievance. By comparing proxies or ethnic hatred and the absence of political representation, economic agendas overwhelmingly dominate statistical models and explanations [30]. Englehart and Hummel [35] that poverty and undiversified economic structure are highly correlated with conflict. The so-called «brown areas» are characterized by clientelist networks that distort accountability and undermine state laws and institutions [36].

There is a relatively vast literature on patronal politics in Kazakhstan and beyond [37; 38; 39]. This description of context shows how economic and political elites merged into a single entity. Politicians allow economic elites to thrive due to the special treatment, subsidies, tax breaks, and access to government contracts. This artificial support of unprofitable business models creates unsustainable and unfair conditions for the competitive businesses, which die out. In order to survive, business must find a «roof» – a protector in the government who, in exchange for a fee, can cover businesses from predatory actions of government officials. Without such protection, government officials can impose additional fees and fines, fabricate legal actions, and/or extort a higher profit margin [39]. The patronal politics is exacerbated by the fact that Kazakhstan receives rents from the sale of natural resources. The dependency on rents, defined as income derived without participation in the production process, offers large opportunities for redistribution of large resources among affiliated firms [40]. The disappearance of the competitive businesses and industries exacerbates inequality, causing more discontent with the existing state of things. Availability of rents and not taxes, also undermines government accountability before its population and makes governing institutional structure inefficient [41; 42; 32]. As a result, patronal politics cause predatory behavior due to the incentives offered by rents and informal leverage of politicians on businesses.

The «greed» hypothesis teaches us three important lessons. First, the existence of grievances almost never provides informational context as to the real motivation for violence (see [30]). Second, the «greed» hypothesis mainly zooms on the elites as the primary actors with economic motivation in the context of patronal

politics and poverty, whose predatory economic schemes create a fertile ground for violence. Third, violence can play many different roles, including the redistribution of resources and profits.

As a result, this theory is different from the socio-political collective grievances, which is first and foremost about justice-seeking. It focuses on systemic marginalization, such as social divisions, political repressions, and inequalities. This is the visible part of the conflict. It is what the media, donors, and academic research pick up as data. Such data is readily available. Indeed, research has shown that neither «greed» nor «grievance» can explain violence. It comes out when a certain unspoken social contract is broken. The motive for such a break may not always be economic (as was in the case of Korday 2020 violence) but can be related to institutional failure and/or coordination failure [43]. Collective understanding of economic marginalization can also serve as a powerful mobilization cause for violence.

Echoing the reflections from «greed» hypothesis, the academic literature naturally concentrated on relative group deprivation theory to explain the conflict. The theory refers to the «feelings that one's group is unfairly deprived of desirable goods in comparison to relevant out-groups» [44]. The relative deprivation theory takes «greed» as the main motivation for violent action, but rather than blaming the elites in charge of mobilization, they also pay attention to the collective economic root causes and context. The theory argues that when one group feels relatively poorer than another group, it begins to share collective grievances against the richer group, which leads to confrontations [1]. Such confrontations are more dominant when society experiences economic difficulties, especially if they live in areas with scarce resources and scarce presence of government institutions and services [45].

According to the theory, perceptions of threat from a neighboring ethnic group increases as vulnerability grows [44] even if objectively, the economic conditions between two groups may not be too different. Instead, the perception of difference matters the most [46; 47; 48]. Chances for violence increase when the ingroup perceives the out-group as the main reason for their way of life [49]. The mechanism of escalation starts when people begin to compare themselves with others. They realize relative disadvantage and start to perceive this relative disadvantage as unfair, sharing «a sense of violated entitlement» [50]. This is illustrative, as violence was absent in villages where the majority of assets are controlled by Kazakh population. Lim [1] conducted a comparative study asking Kazakh residents in three areas that live next to Uyghur, Tajik and Dungan minorities if they feel: deprived (72% yes), disadvantaged (69% positive replies), or inferior at the expense of an ethnic minority (60% of positive replies). Being poor, both statistically and at the level of households [1], Lim calls for Kazakhstanian state to solve the problem of poverty to avoid further clashes. Our fieldwork has shown that the importance of economic conditions cannot be overstated. A notable scholar of ethnic conflict, [51] Vermeersch states that «to defend material interests, self-proclaimed group leaders invoke an ethnic group identity or apply new meaning and interest-based connotations to existing ethnic terms.... in this way, identity and interests are mutually reinforced» [50]. It is possible to read the conflict through both theories, i.e. the greed hypothesis explains the predatory context, while the relative deprivation explains perceptions of the Kazakh population in neighboring villages. Below, we would like to showcase our findings.

Economic Conflict Contexts in Kazakhstan. Our fieldwork in Karakemer and Masanchi has shown that economic conflict context was ripe for violence. The behavior of the former local elites in charge of the government institutions (Kazakh by ethnicity) can be easily read through the «greed» hypothesis. Both groups, Dungans and Kazakhs, shared a long list of grievances against the local government, whom they deemed corrupt and inefficient. While the perceptions of neighboring Kazakh residents reflect the key attributes of the theory of relative deprivation.

Before the violence, local officials and rich landowners derived rents and tolls from Dungan farmers who tilled land. One hectare of land went for KZT 250 000 to KZT 350 000 depending on soil quality. If a land plot had water source, the price tag was higher than arid areas. After paying the money, the renter bought equipment, seeds, irrigation system and hired seasonal workers/involved extended family (Interviews). Access to water was supplied by Akimat (local municipality), which required additional payments to ensure stable supply of water to the field (read: additional bribes) [13]. If one decides to install own dripping irrigation system, they bring equipment from Israel, Germany or China in order to save money on water payments, fertilizers, and weeding the grass (Interviews). When the harvest is ready, members of local municipality, local

law-enforcement, and landowners derived additional fees as a percentage from harvest that had to be secured from stealing in the fall. Our interlocutors stated that they had to involve local police officers and municipality to defend themselves from racketeers (Interviews). With predatory elites in power, it was hard for Dungans to resist making extra payments. The presence of administrative resources in the hands of local government representatives who largely belonged to the same ethnic group enabled them to find cover and allies with institutions in charge of monitoring them. As a result, complaints and grievances nearly always remained in the informal realm [6; 7].

Despite the difficulties, there are two primary reasons why agricultural production brought more revenue to the Dungan community. First, the organizational structure of communal living enabled these Kazakhstani citizens to maximize their profits with clear division of labor within the family structure. Engagement of family into production process enabled Dungan community to collect three harvests of various products per year, which is incredible considering the climatic conditions (Interviews). On average, the family would begin working in the field at 4 o'clock in the morning. Older school children would complete their share of work before school. They would also support the family by doing house chores and providing childcare upon their return from school while their parents work in the field.

Ironically, Kazakhs, who are believed to be «clannish» and tribal [52] lived within their individual families. Without work, many relied on elderly people who received state pensions for stable income. Living in a surviving mode, residents of Karakemer shared great expectations for work and increased quality of life from the state. Their primary goals were to get jobs in schools, municipalities, medical stations, or law enforcement agencies due not only to their knowledge of state language, but also to the fact that these jobs offered stable income and access to connections and power (Interviews). Rather than establishing support networks within the village, they engaged in competitive outbidding – paying the bribes to acquire positions in state institutions (Interviews). The bids not only required upfront bribes, but also included the transfer of percentages from their salaries to the supervisors. As a result, the first year was always hard since it went to recuperate the bribes from the salaries. Two communities adopted different strategies of coping with the predatory environment at the local level. The Dungan communities did their best to minimize cooperation with local government officials, while the Kazakh community wanted to join the state institutions. Both transferred precious resources through the informal channels offering plenty of profit opportunities to local officials.

Second, access to international markets and inclusion of products in regional supply chains offered better revenues than in the domestic market. In order to decrease additional fees, Dungans sold their products in bulk to major cities in Kazakhstan, but also Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Proximity to large urban centers, such as Bishkek, Almaty, and Chinese border offered not only dynamic markets for produce, but also served as sources of primary inputs, such as affordable water irrigation systems, fertilizers, storage systems, and packaging. The produce from Masanchi went as far as Russian Siberian cities (Interviews).

Residents of Karakemer practiced cattle breeding, which does not have access to any supply chain networks, except for the local meat processing plant. Raw meat was either consumed or sold to the plant. Money in Karakemer was scarce and many people preferred to offer taxi services or find daily labor. Animal skins, bones, milk, and other products are not processed and, if not consumed, are dumped/left to rot (Interviews). Raw meat requires cold storage and transportation, which adds to the costs of the final product. In addition, the long distance to the best market (about three hours to Almaty) makes the meat uncompetitive with producers located closer to the city. Exports to Kyrgyzstan and China not only suffer from similar problems but are also undermined by frequent border closure and high taxes. In addition, population in those countries produce similar products making meat from Kazakhstan less competitive. The biproducts of cattle breeding require not only investments, but access to the supply chains. However, since Chinese and Russian products dominate in the Kazakh dairy and shoe consumer markets, these inputs remain out of market demand. As a result, the region of Korday suffered from high inequalities that also coincided with ethnic lines: Kazakhs were visibly poorer than their Dungan neighbors creating fertile conditions for conflict.

Indeed, since two groups live side by side but occupy different economic niches, the theory of relative deprivation fits well in explaining the underlying reasons for violence.

Our findings confirm that constant comparison and realization of relative disadvantage offered strong incentives for violence. Our interlocutor, an elderly woman in Kazakh village of Karakemer lamented «No one is poor there». «Did you see their houses and cars? All of this wealth comes from our, Kazakh, land» complained another resident. They explained the absence of high inequality not because Dungans lived in closeknit communities, but because of their wealth. Most residents thought that they became so rich that it was easy for rich people to support those who are poor (Interviews). The understanding of wealth as a product of labor was absent. Instead, people only preferred to compare their own life with those of their neighbors. In other words, Karakemer residents did not want to connect «the process of wealth creation, such as the number of hours of labor spent in the fields or the number of people in the household, including children, that worked in the fields towards accumulating this wealth» [13]. For Dungan community, being wealthy referred to a person who acquired money through corrupt practices and easy returns (Interviews). If the wealth was embedded in labor, these people were called «prostye» (ordinary) people even if they had cars and proper housing with amenities. The selective comparison of basic life standards without linking them to labor by the Kazakh residents may be surprising since they live so close together.

Kazakh residents also offered an explanation for wealth – «Dungans bought out everyone in local administration» cited a woman with kids; «They are working together: Dungans get the best lands because they pay them» she continued. The majority interpreted their relative disadvantage not through the predatory system established at the local level, but as a matter of Dungans being part of that system. As a result, various myths that stigmatized their neighbors were circulating in Karakemer and later appeared and amplified in the media, such as that Dungans do not serve in the army, they do not know the Kazakh language, they disrespect the traditions. Each of these myths were unfounded at a close look [5; 6] but explained the imposition of host/guest relations. Kazakh residents harbored a feeling of violated entitlement to not only wealth, but also to their own identity. They felt that as hosts, Dungans must recognize their subordinate status since they came to this land from China. The proof that the land belongs to rich Kazakhs and is rented mattered little.

CONCLUSION

The lesson we can draw from this story is that any de-escalation attempt must take into consideration the economic context. It must address not only poverty [1], but also alter the predatory system in local government that imposes informal rents upon everyone and aggravates inequality, which «greed» hypothesis stated, and our case illustrated well. It is also important to think how to develop cattle breeding and insert this niche into the regional value chains to avoid perceptions that are akin to relative deprivation theory. Lastly, the closer interaction between the residents of two communities that supports open and frank conversation about wealth and its distribution within the communities may be useful to bust the multiple myths about Dungans in Karakemer.

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ҚАҚТЫҒЫС ЭКОНОМИКАСЫ: ҚАЗАҚСТАНДАҒЫ ҚАУЫМАРАЛЫҚ ҚАҚТЫҒЫСТАРДЫҢ КОНТЕКСТІ МЕН ТҮПКІ СЕБЕПТЕРІ

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АНДАТПА

Зерттеу мақсаты. Бұл мақаланың мақсаты Қазақстандағы қауымаралық қақтығыстардың түпкі себептерін түсіндіру үшін жанжалдың экономикалық теорияларының негізділігін зерттеу болып табылады.

Әдіснамасы. Мұндай теориялық шолу және сапалы әдіснамалық тәсіл неғұрлым егжей-тегжейлі көрініс береді және жергілікті контекстті ескере отырып, деэскалация стратегиясын құрудың бастапқы қадамын білдіреді.

Зерттеудің бірегейлігі / құндылығы. 2020 жылғы Қордай қақтығысын терең зерттеу арқылы біздің мақала қауымаралық қақтығыстардың тамырын кеңестік мұралар мен тіл саясатымен байланыстыратын зерттеулерді жоққа шығарады. Бұл әдебиеттерде қауымдастықтардың наразылығының себептері жеке басының саясатымен және/немесе ұжымдық құқықтардың бұзылуымен түсіндіріледі және белгілі бір нәрсе ретінде қабылданады. Олар дискурсқа назар аударады. Оның орнына, бұл мақала «ашкөздік» және «салыстырмалы айыру» экономикалық теорияларының Қазақстандағы қақтығыстар контекстінде қолданылуын зерттейді.

Зерттеу нәтижелері. Қазақстан Республикасы Ғылым және жоғары білім министрлігінің ғылыми-зерттеу жобасының қолдауымен жүргізілген далалық жұмыстардың нәтижелерін пайдалана отырып, біз экономикалық «ашкөздік» теориялары жергілікті деңгейде жыртықшылық контекстті түсіндіреді, ал «салыстырмалы айыру» теориялары жергілікті қабылдауды көрсетеді. Осы екі жағдайдың қосындысы ұжымдық наразылық үшін қолайлы жағдай туғызды және жанжалдың негізгі себебі болды.

Түйін сөздер: Салыстырмалы айыру теориясы, қауым аралық зорлық-зомбылық, ашкөздік-шағым пікірталастары, жанжалдың негізгі себептері, жанжал контексті.

Алғыс. Мақала Қазақстан Республикасы Ғылым және жоғары білім министрлігінің «Қазақстандық қоғамдағы жергілікті деңгейдегі этникалық қауымдастықтардың өзара іс-қимыл мәселелері (2014-2021 жж.): этносаралық қақтығыстар динамикасы және зорлық-зомбылықтың өршуіне жол бермеу тәсілдері» гранттық қаржыландыру жобасын іске асыру шеңберінде дайындалған (тіркеу нөмірі: АР 14869488)

Авторлар журналдың редакторы мен рецензенттеріне ерекше алғысын білдіреді. Біз сондай-ақ Габриэль Аза Ньёрге теориялық шолуға көмектескені үшін, ақпарат жинауға және редакциялауға қатысқаны үшін Зульфия Мельдибекова мен Біржан Сахимбекке деген ризашылығымызды білдіргіміз келеді.

ЭКОНОМИКА КОНФЛИКТОВ: КОНТЕКСТ И КОРЕННЫЕ ПРИЧИНЫ МЕЖОБЩИННЫХ СТОЛКНОВЕНИЙ В КАЗАХСТАНЕ

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АННОТАЦИЯ

Цель исследования. Целью данной статьи является исследование обоснованности экономических теорий конфликта для объяснения коренных причин межобщинных столкновений в Казахстане.

Методология. Такой теоретический обзор и качественный методологический подход дают более детальную картину и представляют собой начальный шаг в разработке стратегии деэскалации с учетом локального контекста.

Оригинальность / ценность исследования. Благодаря углубленному изучению Кордайского конфликта в 2020 году наша статья опровергает исследования, которые объясняют корни межобщинного конфликта сохранившимся советским наследием и языковой политикой. В этой литературе поводы для недовольства общин объясняются политикой идентичности и/или нарушением коллективных прав, и воспринимаются как нечто само собой разумеющееся. Они концентрируются на дискурсе. Вместо этого, в этой статье исследуется применимость экономических теорий «жадности» и «относительной депривации» в контексте конфликтов в Казахстане.

Результаты исследования. Используя результаты наших полевых исследований в Кордае, поддержанных исследовательским проектом Министерства науки и высшего образования Республики Казахстан, мы показываем, что экономические теории «жадности» объясняют хищнический контекст на локальном уровне, а теория «относительной депривации» отражает восприятие местного населения.

Сочетание этих двух условий создало благодатную почву для коллективного недовольства и послужило первопричиной конфликтов.

Ключевые слова: теория относительной депривации, межобщинные столкновения, спор «жадность-жалоба», коренные причины конфликта, контекст конфликта.

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